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Upon the founding of this country, the constituent members of what would become the United
States of America declared, “…all men are… endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights” (U.S. Declaration of Independence). This is a philosophy which holds that all human
beings inherently possess a wide array of freedoms that cannot be granted to, or assumed by, any
government. In the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the people of a new and independent
country created a system of government wherein the state possesses certain specific, even
sweeping powers, but where the citizens also retained certain prerogatives which the government
may not invade.
Often lost in the ensuing and evolving debate over the extent of governmental power, and the
limits that the rights of its citizens placed upon it, is a seemingly innocuous, and arguably overly
legalistic, provision in the Bill of Rights. This amendment memorializes the notion articulated in
the preamble to the Declaration of Independence that we should never consider exhaustive any
list of the natural rights of man and the boundaries they place upon the government: “The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people” (Amendment IX). The meaning, scope, and majesty of this Ninth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and its potential impact on the country’s
jurisprudence in the twenty-first century, is the subject of this paper.
While the Supreme Court cites the Ninth Amendment relatively rarely, there do exist cases that
rely on either its direct text or its principles. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell (1947), for
example, the Court held that the Hatch Act, which prohibits federal employees from engaging in
political activities, did not violate the Ninth Amendment. In doing so, the Court articulated the
test which still governs Ninth Amendment cases to this day:
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are subtracted from the
totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people. Therefore, when objection is made
that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power under which the action of
the Union was taken. If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those
rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must fail (United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 1947).
Essentially, the Supreme Court ruled that in times of conflict between enumerated powers and
claimed unenumerated rights, the enumerated powers prevail. While this decision declared
enumerated federal powers superior to unenumerated rights, which is arguably contrary to the
hierarchy of natural rights versus governmental powers as understood by the framers, it provided
a much-needed interpretation of the Ninth Amendment. On the other hand, the analysis stopped
short of addressing the power of the Ninth Amendment in cases involving implied governmental
power. If, as the court questioned, it could not side with a hypothetical right invoked under the
auspices of the Ninth Amendment against a Congressional enactment grounded in an enumerated
power, how would the Ninth Amendment fare in the case of a claimed unenumerated right
competing not against an enumerated power, but a policy which the government argued was
necessary for the progress of civil society?
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The Supreme Court’s answer came eighteen years later in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), when
the Court overturned a Connecticut law banning contraception on the basis that it violated a right
to marital privacy despite the fact that the Constitution enumerates no such right. Technically,
the majority opinion stated that such a right is found in the “penumbras” and “emanations” of
other enumerated rights, such as the First Amendment’s guaranty of freedom of association and
the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination. However, a concurring opinion by
Justice Arthur Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, specifically relied
upon the Ninth Amendment for the foundation of such right, saying that it was among the rights
“retained” by the people (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). Justice Goldberg asserted that not only
can a right be essential regardless of whether it is enumerated, but that it is the Ninth
Amendment, in particular, that protects such essential rights. The Justice explicitly recognized
the place of the Ninth Amendment in the pantheon of Supreme Court jurisprudence:
“…moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not protected by the
Constitution because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight amendments or
elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth Amendment” (ibid.)
Griswold was shortly followed by Roe v. Wade (1973), in which the Court held that the right to
privacy trumped a state ban on all abortions. Although the trial court found that the right was
guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment, the majority opinion declined to adopt that rationale and,
instead, relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and its restriction
of state action. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas flatly rejected
the trial court’s reasoning, unequivocally stating, “The Ninth Amendment obviously does not
create federally enforceable rights” (Roe v. Wade, 1973). As such, Roe marked a prominent shift,
relegating the Ninth Amendment to the forgotten footnotes of case law.
Following that trend, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Court invalidated a statute
criminalizing homosexual activity on the basis that it violated the right to privacy, which the
Court concluded flows from the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, the Ninth Amendment
was not even mentioned in the case, arguably putting the final nail in the coffin entombing the
Ninth Amendment in the graveyard of Supreme Court opinions.
While the Ninth Amendment is unique among Constitutional provisions in its recognition and
protection of the unenumerated rights of the people, other formulations, expositions and lists of
natural individual rights exist around the globe. These alternate catalogs of rights parallel those
that the framers of our own nation’s foundational documents set forth, which demonstrates that
our forefathers correctly understood that the enumerated rights in the first eight amendments of
the Bill of Rights is far from exhaustive, and that additional natural rights are potentially suitable
for recognition and protection under the Ninth Amendment.
The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, provides in Article 3,
“…everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.” Indeed, Thomas Jefferson
listed “life” as the first of the natural rights. Perhaps a further exploration of the natural right to
security of person through the aegis of the Ninth Amendment would result in a more thorough
understanding of the parameters of the natural right to life. This right would presumably be
intentionally broad, just as our current understanding of the bounds of the right to privacy far
exceed the express limitations imposed on the government in the Fourth Amendment. Although
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myriad examples might be used to illustrate the Ninth Amendment’s application in this context, I
explore the potential for a right to education, a right to freedom from attack upon reputation, and
freedom from association below.
Should families have the right to secure their children’s future through education in whatever
reasonable way they see fit? Grappling with this principle, there are those who conclude that the
Ninth Amendment cannot protect such rights due to the Supreme Court’s trend to avoid this
Amendment (e.g., Oldaker 1993, 75). The right to an education and one’s school choice using an
individualist security of person approach under the Ninth Amendment, however, should at least
be the subject of reconsideration. If one concedes, if only because the truth of the proposition is
self-evident, that education is foundational in the evolution of a just and productive society and
essential to the ability of a person to achieve security, the right to an education, and the mode of
its delivery (provided that there are minimum standards that every child must meet in various
academic subjects), seem to easily fall within the penumbra of a life/security interest.
In the same way, we can develop our thinking relative to the right to freedom from attack upon
reputation –the analog of the existing First Amendment right. This right is loosely based on the
European Union’s recognized right to be forgotten, which asserts that “…individuals have the
right to ask search engines to remove links with personal information about them.” It goes on:
“This applies where the information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive”(
European Commission, 2012). While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech and the
press, these rights are not absolute. This is readily apparent through the current legal definitions
of libel, defamation, and slander, which circumscribe First Amendment protections and proscribe
the misuse of information in an unfair method to harm individuals (libel, defamation and slander
legal definitions obtained at Legal Information Institute, Cornell University). Similarly, the right
to protection of reputation would work as an analog to the First Amendment, only enjoining the
sullying of an individual’s reputation if deemed unfair under certain clear legal standards. In this
way, only the individuals who are being targeted have something to lose, and their exercise of
the right to protection of reputation does not infringe upon the legitimate rights of others.
An example of the potential application of this right comes in the form of the publication of
mugshots. In an ongoing class action against websites and news outlets publicizing and charging
individuals as much as thousands of dollars for the removal of mugshots, a claim is made that
once people have served their sentence, or in some cases, have been acquitted of all charges,
their mugshots should not continue to appear in the public sphere (Kravets 2012). Current laws
do not extend far enough to protect these claimants without a recognized right to protect one’s
reputation because technology and data sharing is evolving much more rapidly than the legal
system in the United States. Consequently, a right to protection of reputation can be established
and applied on a case-by-case basis under the Ninth Amendment. In this way, individuals may
protect their ability to live securely, notwithstanding a recognized right to freedom of speech
which, in these cases, actually interferes with the exercise of the countervailing natural right.
The next proposed right, freedom from association, is inspired by Article 20 of the United
Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “no one may be compelled to
belong to an association.” Associations come in many forms, such as political groups,
recreational clubs, unions, and homeowners’ associations. While most associations are voluntary,
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there are those that are obligatory. This is particularly applicable to the “right to work” sphere
and the idea that one should not be compelled to join a union as a prerequisite to various fields of
employment. While there is no way to force association, in some states “an employee can be
forced to pay certain union dues or be fired from his or her job” (National Right to Work 2017).
Right to work proponents suggest that even if a union provides a beneficial service to the
employee, it should be up to the individual to decide whether those protections are worth the cost
of association. This is especially true if union dues are used in ways with which the employee
may disagree, such as political donations (Sherk 2012). While unions themselves largely oppose
the right to work, the individual’s decision to disassociate does not infringe upon the rights of the
union; the liberty only effects the union by limiting its power over the individual and its stream
of income.
The recent case of Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 31, argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on February 26, 2018, squarely addressed the
right to freedom from association and, thus, presented a perfect opportunity for a case to be
decided under the Ninth Amendment, rather than on the basis on which it was argued. In Janus,
the Petitioner asserts that the Court should overrule its 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education. There, the Court validated the practice of public employee unions charging nonmembers “fair share” or “agency” fees (a reduced amount of dues that union members pay).
These ostensibly cover the costs the union incurs in negotiating contracts with governmental
agencies because those contracts inherently benefit all public employees, so to do otherwise
would arguably give the nonmembers a “free ride.” Janus’ argument endeavors to persuade the
Court to find that contract negotiations with public bodies constitute a form of political speech,
and that under the recent Supreme Court decisions of Harris v. Quinn (2014) and Knox v.
SEIU, Local 1000 (2012), Janus cannot be compelled to support speech with which he does not
agree.
The Supreme Court ruled on the matter on June 27, 2018. In a 5-4 decision, it overturned
existing precedent and held that public employees who are not union members cannot be forced
to pay “agency fees” to unions which negotiate contracts on behalf of all public employees. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, provides that all public union activities are inherently
political and that, therefore, forcing nonmembers to contribute to the union violates their First
Amendment “right of silence” (the right against being forced to say something [or fund the
publication of statements] in which one does not believe). This decision continues the trend of
this Court (and particularly Justice Alito, who authored the Citizens United opinion) to expand
the scope of First Amendment rights. Given the fact that the First Amendment explicitly
guaranties only freedom of, not freedom from speech, however, the case could have, and perhaps
should have, been decided under the Ninth Amendment’s protection of unenumerated rights, and
specifically the right to be free from association.
Although the First Amendment protects the freedom to associate and its analog, the freedom
from association is not mentioned in our organic law; as we have seen, the latter is recognized in
other documents such as in Article 20 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as a right that inherently belongs to all persons. “Fair share” or “agency” fees clearly
compel someone who does not want to belong to the union to do so in all but name only, and to
support that union’s activities, regardless of one’s personal preferences. State laws which permit
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the imposition of these fees plainly violate the inherent natural right to be free from association,
and the Supreme Court should deem these laws to be violative of the Ninth Amendment for that
reason.
Today, the grassroots movements to begin implementing these rights exist despite the apparent
reluctance to rely on the Ninth Amendment. The right to an education and school choice is being
debated on the national level. The right to protection of reputation is being asserted in lower
courts and has recently been elevated to class action status (Kravets 2012). Likewise, the right to
freedom from association is building momentum through legislative recognition of the right to
work enacted in twenty-eight states. With a more broadly recognized understanding of the Ninth
Amendment as the preferred vehicle for protecting the natural right to security of person, rights
protecting the unenumerated rights of the people of the United States would have a genuine and
straightforward path for development.
Inspired by rights enumerated around the globe, such as in the United Nation’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, I propose we use the Ninth Amendment to protect the right of
individuals to be secure in their person. In addition to the already developing right to education
and school choice, we should bring rights to protection of reputation and freedom from
association to the forefront of the debate. Viewing an individual’s reputation as a right, we can
use the Ninth Amendment to reform current libel and defamation laws in order to protect
individuals from an evolving and continued threat to their ability to function as productive
members of society. Likewise, freedom from association would allow individuals to control their
relationships in the workplace and in their private lives, and constrain the activities of
oftentimes-large private groups that attempt to proscribe limits upon individuals’ actions. In this
way, we could invoke the Ninth Amendment to protect the right to security of person, thus
shaping future debates about the extent of governmental, and even majority, power in the United
States.
The Ninth Amendment is not a one-off historical anachronism aimed at protecting nonexistent
rights. Instead, it is properly seen, and should be construed by the courts, as a bulwark against
undue governmental interference in people’s private lives.
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